




Mergers and Acquisitions Perspective Observations on 2007 – Expectations for 2008

The story of 2007 was one of two very different chapters. For the first few months, we saw many similarities with conditions in 2006. Announced merger and acquisition activity was healthy, averaging nearly 30 transactions per month. Deal pricing remained consistent with those levels from previous quarters. Bank and thrift equities were trading well and, despite slowing financial results, they appeared to still be on solid footing. Yet by mid-year, the proverbial shoe had dropped. As we had been predicting in our previous *Industry Updates* over the past two years, residential asset values finally succumbed to their unsustainable and inflated prices, caused by historically low rates and excessively cheap, risky and available credit. As the summer approached and the consensus grudgingly opined that the housing slump was a real and enduring issue, the financial sector began experiencing massive write-downs on structured mortgage products. As a result, shares of financial-related companies sold off considerably. At first, many deemed the downturn to be an isolated liquidity event, similar to what occurred during the last notable credit crisis of 1998-1999. They believed this was a unique occurrence which resulted from structured product losses and was confined to mortgage originators and the large financial institutions that traded in derivative financial instruments. However, as second quarter earnings were released, concerns arose regarding the asset quality of the banking sector at large and, in some instances, the regulatory capital ratios of various institutions. Now, as we enter a 2008 economy characterized by stagnant growth, markets are no longer grappling with the source of the turmoil, but its degree of depth and duration.

From a mergers and acquisitions perspective, the immediate implication of this ensuing credit deterioration has been reduced transaction activity. Potential buyers saw both their purchasing power and targets lose value, and many historically active acquirers tabled plans they had in the pipeline, often due to their own asset quality issues. Transaction multiples remained only somewhat resilient over the second half of the year—multiples that we foresee declining as sellers and buyers gradually realign their expectations for deal pricing. Usually, deterioration in the credit environment has a dampening effect on M&A volume...2008 will be no exception. Despite this, we expect familiar but important countervailing forces to keep volumes more buoyant than in past credit downturns. There are a number of possible reasons why banks will look to sell this year, including: global consolidation trends; unrelenting margin pressures; distress scenarios; succession issues; strategic opportunities; and, a very likely change in the capital gains tax rate. As always, pricing will vary with the strength of the particular franchise (in addition to other factors, such as portfolio exposure to residential and C&D asset classes), yet even the best performers and most unique franchises will be hard-pressed to capture deal multiples reminiscent of 2006. The overall economic environment and uncertainty in the markets stemming from the systemic downturn of the credit cycle will prove to be an enormous challenge.

Transaction Levels Gradually Retreat

There were 284 total transactions announced in 2007, down slightly from the 303 total deals announced in 2006. Nonetheless, with the exception of 2006, the total deal count still exceeded that of every year since 1999. Despite the strong number from a year-over-year perspective, a quarterly examination of M&A activity reveals a more telling picture of diminishing activity. There were 86, 71, 69, and 58 deals over the successive quarters, respectively, representing a 33% drop from the first to the fourth quarter. A monthly analysis produces an even more revealing trend of deal flow tapering off—December 2007 produced only nine transactions, compared to 35 the previous



Source: SNL Financial




Source: SNL Financial

January. Annualizing the transaction level in December yields a rate of 108 deals per year, a level of deal flow that is not even 40% of the previous three-year average.

Smaller institutions (less than \$250 million in assets), who are the most vulnerable in the current economic environment, represented approximately 70% of all selling institutions—an increase from 45% in 2006. Conversely, larger institutions with over \$1 billion in assets represented the selling institution in roughly 12% of total transactions. Thrift sales continue to comprise a relatively small percentage of the overall activity and, in absolute terms, exhibit decreasing volumes. On the buy-side, approximately half the acquisitions were made by large banks (those with over \$1 billion in assets).

Median deal value was larger this past year at \$33 million compared to \$26 million in 2006. However, in 2007, average deal size was slightly smaller. The average deal was worth \$336 million compared to \$433 million the prior year. This difference can be attributed to four deals of over \$10 billion in value in 2006, including (in descending order of size) the acquisition of Golden West by Wachovia; the merger of Mellon Financial and Bank of New York; Capital One's purchase of North Fork; and, the Regions-AmSouth merger. By contrast, only two deals exceeded the \$10 billion mark in 2007: Bank of America's acquisition of LaSalle Bank and the BBV purchase of Compass Bancshares. As usual, the bulk of transactions were on the small end: 59% of the 2007 transactions reporting deal value were below \$50 million.


Pricing Multiples Reflect Downward Trend in Equity and Asset Performance




Source: SNL Financial

For the first half of 2007, bank stocks experienced a modest decline of less than 10%. However, in July, housing and credit worries sparked a sell-off in financials that continued into 2008. Short-interest ratios for bank stocks rose quickly and institutional money flows indicated a sector rotation out of financials—two classic indicators that “smart money” had retreated from the industry. Over the course of 2007, the SNL Mid-Cap Bank and Thrift Index lost approximately 23% of its value. At the time of publication, the SNL Mid-Cap Index was down an additional 5% since the beginning of the year. The SNL Mid-Cap Index price-to-tangible book trading multiples declined, as well, from a 2005-2006 average of 3.1x to a 2007 year-end reading of 2.4x. Obviously, these drops reflect uneasiness surrounding existing asset qualities, and the potential impact on current and future earnings. Earnings concerns are not misplaced: the industry's overall ROA had the lowest result since 1992, at 0.92% of assets for year-end 2007.


Historical precedent suggests it generally takes 36 months to go from peak to trough in a credit cycle, and we think this cycle is likely to follow that approximate timeframe. In fact, given how loose and poor underwriting standards were over the last few years and how out of alignment the housing market became, we think the credit cycle could, unfortunately, extend even longer than 36 months. Although this drastic shift from an extremely available to tightened credit environment is rare, it is by no means unprecedented. Over the past two decades we have experienced deterioration in credit markets during the S&L and banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and, following the dotcom collapse and corporate governance fiasco in the earlier part of this decade. Recently, the *Financial Times* put our current environment into even greater historical perspective: in the decades following 1950, nearly \$1.50 of credit was being generated for every \$1 of GDP growth, with the ratio climbing in the 1980s and rising to \$3.50 during the 1990s. By 2007, almost \$4.50 of credit was being created for every \$1 of GDP growth.




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
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
In line with the 2007 equity sell-off, we began seeing transaction multiples retreating beginning in April. For thrifts, the decrease in Price/Tangible Book Value and Premium/Core Deposit deal multiples mirrored the

general decline in thrift equity values, each down roughly 40% from the beginning of the year. For banks, however, the decrease in pricing was only slightly more subtle. Nationally, between the first and fourth quarters, average multiples experienced the following declines: Price/TBV—down 25%, from 2.6x to 1.9x; Premium/Core Deposits—down 45%, from 22.8% to 12.6%; and, Price/Assets—down 25%, from 23% to 17%. Comparing average multiples for mid-size deals (those between \$100M and \$1 billion) from the first to the fourth quarters (with 16, 9, 19 and 6 deals each quarter, respectively) reveals similar percentage declines: Price/TBV—down 30%, from 3.3x to 2.3x; Premium/Core Deposits—down 44%, from 32% to 18%; and, Price/Assets—down 30%, from 27% to 19%. The least indicative multiple for the year was Price/Earnings. Average P/E ratios for all deals experienced a slight uptick in 2007; obviously, this is reflective not of better pricing, but a disproportionately faster fall in earnings over the course of 2007.



Source: SNL Financial

As usual, larger sellers (defined as banks over \$1 billion in asset size) were able to command slightly better pricing on the basis of Price/Tangible Book and Premium/Core Deposits. Larger banks commanded a Price/TBV of 2.9x versus a 2.2x multiple for smaller sellers and a 23.9% premium on core deposits versus a 17.3% premium for small banks. There are a few reasons why large institutions continue to command better pricing. Not only does their larger market share garner premiums, but more established banks with scale typically have more diversified revenue streams and larger fee incomes. That said, we do frequently see small banks achieve superior pricing in certain



Source: SNL Financial

instances. For example, cost reductions are often more easily achieved for smaller banks, thereby making them an attractive target. Additionally, bigger banks have more robust distribution channels for their products, and incorporating a smaller bank into a larger platform can have a greater potential for generating higher returns on tangible equity.

Easy Come, Easy Go

Generally, those banking markets which experienced the fastest run-up in residential asset prices have also been the same markets hardest hit since the downturn in the credit cycle. Residential and condominium construction lenders in Florida, Georgia, California, Nevada, and Arizona were hit hardest. Furthermore, nearly all construction and development lending has seen deterioration. Other parts of the U.S., such as the Pacific Northwest, New England, Texas, the Midwest (outside of Michigan), and certain MSAs such as Washington, D.C. and New York City, have generally been more stable. Without as much speculative construction as seen in other parts of the country, these areas have less speculative gains to give back (although some losses are naturally to be expected).


From a financial statement perspective, the asset deterioration has meant that NPAs have increased by more than 50% on average across the nation in 2007. The average net charge-off ratio in the fourth quarter of 2007 was 0.38%, above the 2006 fourth quarter average of 0.28%. We expect these numbers to rise as we experience a further deterioration of the U.S. housing market, and, in conjunction, increased provisioning for the fourth quarter. When this process finally runs its course, we foresee a return of institutional investors (which to this point have left in large volume) and resulting positive price support on equity values.

The pertinent credit problems in various regions are reflected in the decreasing levels of M&A activity. Bank sales fell off precipitously in the Southeast, especially Florida, where there were only two deals announced in the last quarter of 2007. The Midwest was the most active region, with 105 sale transactions taking place in 2007, followed by the Southeast and Southwest regions, with a respective 59 and 35 deals each. New England, the most mature banking market, was expectedly the least active region with only 17 bank sales.

All-Cash Financing Loses Steam

The use of all-cash financing decreased in 2007 M&A deals, now almost equal to the frequency of mixture consideration (e.g., cash and stock). For the most part, this represents a long-term trend towards the increased use of hybrid financing, which can provide an opportunity for a more optimal design of *pro forma*


capital levels and earnings accretion. However, the year-over-year downtick can also be attributed to the effective shutdown of the trust preferred pools traditionally used to finance acquisitions. Dislocation in the structured finance market has significantly impaired the availability of regulatory capital to banks in the pooled trust preferred market; rates on recently placed TPS represent a 160 basis point increase over similar paper placed just six months ago (e.g., LIBOR +140 in the summer to LIBOR +300 presently). Thus, buyers frequently have no alternative but to use common stock in increasing amounts to finance purchases.



Source: SNL Financial

Branch Transactions and De Novo Activity


With the exception of 2006, the previous six years had witnessed a decreasing trend in both branch transactions and the overall number of branches sold. In 2007, we saw this trend resume with a final branch transaction count of 67 for both bank and thrift branch sales. The aggregate number of branches sold decreased to 179 in 2007, down from 240 the year before. Furthermore, the aggregate value of the deposits in these sales diminished by more than 50%. In 2006, \$7.3 billion dollars of deposits changed hands versus approximately \$3.3 billion in 2007. The largest branch sale was by Doral Financial Corporation to New York Commercial Bank, consisting of 11 branches containing \$378 million in deposits. This proved to be a small deal in comparison to Region's 39 branch sale



Source: SNL Financial

of mostly Mobile, AL, facilities to RBC Centura Bank in 2006.

Recently, accumulating earning assets has not been nearly as difficult as accumulating core deposits. Culminating in 2006, banks had been eager to acquire deposit growth through branch acquisitions or de novo branching. This has changed. Since the start of 2007, branch transaction levels have dropped as bank managers realize both asset and deposit growth levels will be equally challenging. However, those in need of immediate branch expansion were willing to pay a premium; the median premium paid on deposits for 2007 was 7.9%, a level higher than at any point during the previous six years. Going forward, we do not believe there will be an impactful number of branch sales, but we do believe there will be an increase. Recently, banks have generated enormous asset growth and have required more deposits and, therefore, branch expansion. An examination of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet for commercial banks shows that the loan/deposit ratio increased from 94% in December 1994 to 102% as of December 2007—illustrating both the increased leverage on bank balance sheets as well as the highly competitive deposit gathering environment. The latter is highlighted by a transaction account decline of -4.1%—the largest annual decline since 2003. For those banks whose asset growth has significantly slowed, we expect them to concentrate on the disposal of less efficient and more costly branches.



Source: SNL Financial

Where we do see banks selling branches are those that have run into financial difficulty. Branch sales are an especially attractive method in today's environment to reduce the size of the balance sheet and add capital. The sale of liabilities has a doubling effect on increasing the capital ratios—reducing the denominator while simultaneously increasing the equity account. Thus, pruning branch facilities in certain non-strategic markets may be attractive for many banks, especially those with asset quality issues. This is very true for the giant banks; as an example, Citibank recently announced its intention to trim its branch network. Furthermore, in the past, growth has been bottle-

necked at times by the availability of data processing conversion centers (DPs) used to convert client data during the integration phase of an acquisition. Since traditional M&A transaction volume will slow, these DP conversion centers will have renewed availability to focus on branch deals—yet another factor suggesting increased branch sale activity.


De novo bank openings have remained steady—146 de novo institutions opened in 2007 versus 150 in 2006. Despite regional economic difficulty, California and Florida bank de novos still compose a large percentage of this number, with about 20 openings each over the past two years. Texas also has been active with 22 openings in 2007. However, we expect a radical downshift in future de novo openings as capital for such endeavors has dried up. We believe the de novo cycle is over and will remain at extremely low levels for years to come. Additionally, many de novos which started over the last few years and have not gained traction will look to sell as investors, executives, and board members alike become frustrated.

Financial Advisors Create Value

For the 15th consecutive year, financial advisors have helped shareholders and financial institutions maximize value. The numbers tell the story. Applying the Price/TB multiples to a selling bank using a financial advisor would result in a value 12% higher (at 2.4x TBV compared to 2.1x TBV) than in a scenario where an organization chose not to hire a financial advisor. Transactions are becoming ever more complex and difficult to carry out and complete, with much more than pricing and consideration at stake. This can include contracts, board representation, benefit plan coverage, and critical social issues. Not surprisingly, with data this conclusive, the percentage of transactions in which an advisor is hired is increasing.

In times of increasingly interested trans-national and international buyers, an advisor with a deep breadth of knowledge and proven market experience in dealing with dozens of contacts nationally and internationally is invaluable. Many sellers are not informed of potential out-of-market buyers. Advisors with a national presence can bring unknown buyers into a transaction that are often higher bidders and are a better overall fit for the seller than local buyers—potentially offering greater management autonomy and reduced termination of the employee base. Advisors are not only familiar with what the fit on paper looks like with out-of-market buyers, but also with how these buyers will proceed in a transaction. This process may include bidding, the consideration mix they prefer to use, and how they handle the social integration. The knowledge and experience of dealing with out-of-market buyers allows financial advisors to create a more favorable deal for a selling institution's key constituents—

shareholders, the board, management, employees, and customers alike.



Source: SNL Financial

2008—The Look Ahead

As far as forecasts go, the prediction for 2008 M&A activity in the banking sector is about as challenging as they come. Although we foresee a material drop in total M&A activity, our outlook is not nearly as bleak as it was 30 days ago. The substantial cuts in short-term rates by the Fed have helped prop up banking valuations and should help mitigate the downturn in credit. However, the enormous uncertainty surrounding the potential for further credit deterioration and its impact on earnings (within acquirer's own institutions *and* at target institutions) will sideline many potential transactions from occurring. Yet, despite impaired asset values and diminished capital bases, there remain certain fundamental business rationales driving consolidation that, taken in context, justify our outlook for a base line of activity in 2008, particularly compared to the end of 2007.

Contracting NIM

Despite the heavy cutting by the Fed impacting the short end of the yield curve, the inability of banks to attract depositors at substantially lower rates reveals an important conclusion for 2008 and beyond: heavy net interest margin pressures are here to stay. As of the fourth quarter 2007, the national average NIM was 4.05%, the lowest level since 1991. For community banks, which make comparably larger percentages of their revenue through spread income, this figure is especially worrisome. As in previous years, deposit pricing remains exceptionally competitive and the Fed rate cuts have impacted asset pricing more immediately and dramatically than the cost of funding. Thus, margin pressure continues to be a very real headwind for bank industry earnings. Deposit pricing is clearly not dropping at levels commensurate with the Fed rate cuts. As an illustration, average rates on bank CD products have dropped only a modest proportion of the 100 basis point reduction which occurred in the federal funds rate from September to December 2007. We believe the additional rate cuts of 125 basis points in January 2008 will ultimately have a similarly minor

effect on banking deposit rates. This dynamic underscores the degree of competition for deposits, not the least of which continues to come from distressed companies like Countrywide or online platforms such as E*Trade and ING. These institutions continue to offer significantly higher rates on CDs, interest checking, and money market products than the average bank.

Growth Rate and Balance Sheet Pressures

Another factor that will drive banks to explore a merger or acquisition is that there are simply very few opportunities for growth in the banking industry. At best, home prices will decline by only single digits for the duration of 2008 (but as we have written extensively, we believe housing prices will weaken meaningfully further in value) and we are now seeing a dramatically slowing commercial real estate environment, as well. This makes asset growth rates of previous years difficult to replicate. Compounding the aforementioned NIM pressures is the reality that balance sheet growth will continue to be more difficult in the future environment than in years past. Obviously, those banks with asset quality issues will be forced to shrink balance sheets in the short term to maintain proper capital/liability ratios. Many management teams are currently focused on mitigating the damage caused by reckless lending, a consequence of overly aggressive growth in real estate lending over the past few years. Yet, the real issue moving forward will be the increased difficulty in resuming balance sheet growth in light of recessionary pressure. While a majority of economists are now forecasting a stagnant or negative growth in the quarters to come, based on unemployment and home price indicators, it is safe to say that certain economies like Florida and California are already in the midst of a recession. Additionally, as individual consumers begin to bear the repercussions of diminished home values and tighter credit standards, it begs the question: where can asset and lending growth come from?

This dynamic is particularly worrisome for the average community bank. Not only is it important to remember that many regional and community bank business models are built around mortgage and construction lending, but they also lack the diversity of services and banking products to weather the oncoming economic malaise. While surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest that personalized service has traditionally been a competitive advantage for small- and mid-sized financial institutions, as time goes by, it is becoming increasingly clear that smaller banks cannot expect to compete with their larger adversaries in terms of product mix and the array of service offerings. On the whole, community banks are exceptionally weak in fee-oriented revenue sources. Due to the lack of growth

prospects and limited revenue streams, these banks will come under further earnings pressures. Although there are always the smaller regional banks that can find and exploit unique niches, there are sometimes few available options for the typical community bank. In some circumstances, consolidation and the resulting augmentation of the product portfolio might be exactly what is needed to maintain a best-in-class customer experience. For the same reasons, buyers will sometimes have no choice but to resort to acquisition strategies in order to maintain earnings growth. Nonetheless, these forces—a cut-throat NIM environment and further obstacles to balance sheet growth—are reflective of the new dynamic within the banking industry. While not new, we continue to trend toward a redefined equilibrium of fewer players with lower margins and cost levels that can offer a broad suite of banking products and services.

Capital Gains Tax Implications

Beyond the above economic and operating conditions, toward the second half of the year, we also envision political issues coming to bear on M&A decision-making. The current capital gains rate of 15% was extended through 2010 by the Tax Reconciliation Act, signed into law in 2006. However, it seems increasingly likely that the Democratic control of Congress may be strengthened in the November 2008 election cycle. Already there have been rumblings in Congress of increasing the capital gains rate to 20%, 25%, or even back to 28%. Additionally, if either Senator Obama or Senator Clinton wins the White House, both have made clear their desire to raise capital gains taxation rates to their pre-1997 levels, which were 28%. Also, be aware, as with the income tax changes in 1993, given that the Democrats again control both the House and Senate, the increases in capital gains tax rates could be made to retroactively apply starting January 1st of 2009 if a bill is presented to the new President immediately after inauguration. We believe this potential development could encourage a number of otherwise hesitant sellers to consummate deals. After all, should the tax rate be increased at the beginning of 2009, a typical bank considering a sale would have to generate significantly more value over the course of a year in order to garner the same after-tax gain on a sale in 2008.

A New Breed of Buyers

From a selling perspective, the aforementioned political and economic conditions create very real motivations for an organization to sell. And yet, there are obvious ramifications from the housing fallout and credit squeeze that place downward pressure on the level of M&A activity. It is obvious the active buyers of recent years are momentarily postponing plans for acquisitions. After all, reduced equity values and current capital market conditions make acquisition

financing very difficult. However, the door remains open to those well-poised to take advantage of current market conditions. We view three major opportunistic buyers who stand to benefit in this new M&A environment and in some cases have already begun entering the picture: the resilient banks with strong capital levels and stable asset quality profiles; private equity firms and special investor groups; and, international banks supported by strong currencies.

Those banks (and there are quite a few of them) that have weathered the recent market turmoil are especially well-positioned to make acquisitions under current conditions. As we will discuss below, at this point in the cycle, banks with healthy capital levels and minimal foreseeable asset quality issues are particularly well-positioned to make disciplined offers for banks that complement their business models or geographic footprints. After all, with acquirers facing the same margin pressures, and the inability to achieve organic growth, the need for acquisition growth becomes an attractive vehicle for acquirers to deal with these pressures while at the same time enhancing their franchise value.

Additionally, private equity firms and special investor groups are also seeking disciplined acquisitions. In certain situations, pooled investor money may prove to be the only source of capital available to remedy those institutions which are under significant financial distress or extraordinary regulatory pressures. Anecdotal evidence bears out the theory, as well—we are already witnessing increased interest from private buyer groups searching for distressed banks looking for exits as well as those in need of large capital infusions. This phenomenon will endure through 2008, and likely beyond, composing a significant buyer contingent.

As much as ever, in 2008, the industry must recognize the impetus for consolidation resulting from the forces of globalization and regionalization. As the U.S. dollar weakens and domestic equity values retreat, foreign buyers are increasingly enticed by new opportunities to enter key U.S. markets at discounted levels. Witness, for example, RBC Centura's purchase of Alabama National in September for \$1.6 billion in cash and stock—the latest of a series of cross-border deals for RBC, which is taking advantage of currency strength to capture substantial U.S. market share. Another example includes National Australia Bank's acquisition of Great Western Bancorp for \$798 million in late November 2007, a transaction that created an immediate U.S. presence for the Australian bank in Iowa, Arizona, Nebraska, and South Dakota. In 2007, three of the eight highest-priced deals on a Price/TBV basis involved a foreign buyer. Despite the formidable regulatory challenges inherent in U.S. banking, we believe current uncertainty in the market will only serve

to promote cross-border transactions. These deals will become increasingly common as foreign banks take advantage of their currency strength and relatively stronger balance sheets which, in turn, will benefit those sellers seeking the appropriate transaction. We have witnessed some activity and interest from international buyers for smaller banks; however, most of the activity will likely occur at the mid-cap to larger size. Nonetheless, the resulting “pull-effect” that cascades down to the regional and community bank level should not be underestimated.

There is another trend to monitor, as well. Now, more than ever, banks will have an eye toward pursuing strategic affiliations. In 2007, six of the year’s eight mergers-of-equals transactions were announced after the large financial sell-off began in July. Clearly, mergers with little or no premiums became increasingly enticing as stock currencies fell. Whether the financing for acquisitions exists or not, the basic business desire for bolstering market share in key markets has not dissipated. Thus, many banks could benefit from strategic affiliations with peers that are complementary in both geography and product mix. Although these deals require more cultural fit, we envision a number of these scenarios building momentum in the coming months with interested participants conducting further due diligence and seeking discussions with interested parties.

We Can Help

Although we foresee M&A activity slowing overall in 2008, there are enough unique dynamics at play for both sellers and acquirers to create some real opportunities for transactions, particularly in niche marketplaces. From an M&A perspective, 2008 is poised to be a challenging and interesting year, and the top-performers will have a disciplined strategy deployed to take full advantage of their unique markets and circumstances. Hovde Financial has the experience, knowledge base, and financial expertise to delve into these challenges with you and explore what they mean for your institution. Please feel free to contact us in any one of our offices listed below:

- Washington, D.C. at 202.775.8109,
- Chicago, IL at 847.991.6622,
- Los Angeles, CA at 310.535.9200,
- Palm Beach, FL at 561.279.7199,
- Austin, TX at 512.478.7575, or
- Dallas, TX at 972.888.1660.